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By J. L. Brierly. Oxford:
Clarendon Press; New York: Humphrey Milford. 1944. Pp. 142.

THE, OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW.
$2.00.

This little book is one of infinite wisdom. A product of great learning,
presenting conclusions reached after sober reflection, it is nicely reasoned,
lucidly and succinctly written. It contains thoughts to be taken into consideration by those who build the international order after the war. While
only recently available here, it was published in England in 1944. Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, the atom bomb have all followed. Of course,
there may not be unanimous agreement with all the author's conclusions,
but neither statesmen nor scholars can safely fail to study and reflect upon
them.
This is a book of great moderation and patience. It does not attempt
to sell a specific nostrum. It recognizes that no matter what kind of an
international order is constructed the world may not come to a sad and
quick end. Nor is the perfect order likely to be born full-grown. We should
profit by past experience (and are fools if we don't). This book is not
out of date because of San Francisco. No one can rightly suppose that
the present Charter of the United Nations is the final order. Some think
it doesn't go far enough; some that it goes too far; some that the atom
bomb already has us practically bogged in primeval muck unless we
immediately have some other order. Apart from all such'impatient views,
change will come sometime, somehow, as it generally comes to be believed
necessary-perhaps not by the day after tomorrow morning, however. As
quoted from John Morley: "In politics we have an art in which development depends upon small modifications. . .. To disdain anything short
of an organic change in thought or institution is infatuation." 1

Mr. Brierly begins by pointing out that in building the international
order "international law will be one of the instruments that the architects
will use." 2 We will not start anew, for we have an existing system, not
"a sort of sociological maid of all work, but a highly specialized instrument." 1 Its primary function is to define or delimit the respective spheres
in which each state is entitled to exercise authority without trespassing in
the sphere of other states. International law does not have the function
of regulating all international life. Its normal use is not usually realized
because it mostly is not dramatic and is not publicized. But in issues of
high politics, states have not heretofore allowed law to dictate policy.
In discussing "War and the Law," the author concludes That the
classical attempt "to establish in international law a distinction between
legal and illegal war always contained a large element of unreality." 4 The
difficulty has been in determining the "aggressor" and in organizing a
collective security which would be overwhelming. These are vital points
which must be met through any effective international order. "Vital
Interests" exist. But each state should not be entitled to define its own
interests without distinguishing those that are reasonable from those that
are not. Indeed, vital interests exist inside a state and are recognized by
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municipal law. "Like factions within the state, so states in the society
of states must be forbidden to bse physical force against one another
except in circumstances which are defined by law." 5 The Kellogg Pact
failed because there was no effective organization to back it up. Law
does not create order; it can only help to sustain order after it has been
firmly established.
Mr. Brierly thinks that the Covenant of the League of Nations will
be thought by historians to have been the biggest single step taken towards
the goal of international order." It was not a pacifist document. The
principle that war is always a matter of general concern was sound.
Under the Covenant, each state was to decide for itself whether it was
obliged to take any action because another state had resorted to war in
disregard of its covenants. Under the Charter, the Security Council will
decide upon action. But the states will furnish the means 'for taking such
action, and it will still be true that "in the last resort all we have to rely
on is the willingness of states to keep their promises, whatever the system
by which the decision is arrived at." 7 The machinery is improved, but
unless the states carry out their agreements with the Security Council, the
machinery will produce nothing. There must be "good arms" to back
"good law."

The author makes a happy quotation from Mr. Churchill in the Commons in 1938: "What-is there ridiculous about collective security? The
only thing that is ridiculous about it is that we have not got it." 8 The
rule of law is meaningless without the rule of force to support it. "The
part of the problem of enforcement which is vitally urgent is the subjection
to law of the use by states of armed force, and for this generation that
will certainly be a sufficient task' 9 The obvious method is the establishment of a strong central government. Federations on less than a world
scale are no solution; they would only reduce the number of states. Mr.
Brierly thinks a world federation at this time is not feasible. We need
waste no time quarreling about the idea-would the United States agree
to it? Not in January, 1946, notwithstanding the atom bomb. We should
do the best we can now and rely upon future growth for betterment.
Sound indeed is the statement that order "must be secured, if at all, by a
sufficient number of states being willing to cooperate or combine together
to establish and maintain it." 10 Neutrality is no way out for a state
which is appraising whether the risks of cooperation are balanced by the
prospective benefits. "It is an expensive way of providing collective
security to have to improvise the system after war has begun." 11 "'It
isof the essence of such a system that states should declare beforehand
what they will do in future circumstances," 12 for the great value is in its
deterrent effect. It is essential that there be performance when it is due.
The system must also be built upon power to perform. Smaller powers
have an essential role as well as the greater ones. "The details of the
system are not a matter on which lawyers have any special competence," 13
statesmen should decide them.
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As to the machinery for the settlement of international disputes, Mr.
Brierly finds the existing machinery of international judicature to be in
the main satisfactory, and far ahead of other international organization.
This court machinery has been substantially continued through the Statute
of the International Court of Justice adopted at San Francisco. But judicial
decision will not be the most important part of the settlement of international disputes. "The most difficult disputes, those that endanger international peace, are not likely to be settled by courts." 1" Next the book
deals with "peaceful change," 'r concluding: "It looks therefore as though
the only kind of procedure of peaceful change that is likely to be practicable in any future with which we need concern ourselves is one in which
third states may be able to influence, but not to decide, the manner in
which a demand for a change in legal rights is to be dealt with."1 6 The
author sees no way in which there can be assurance that all disputes will
be settled. The veto power in the Security Council certainly gives no such
assurance. As Mr. Brierly says there is no such assurance in the institutions of our national public life, how can we expect it in international
affairs ?
This stimulating book commands attention. It should particularly
be read by those who think that international law is a sham and by those
others, also misguided, who "seem to think that it is a force with inherent
strength of its own, and that if we had the sense to set the lawyers to work
to draft a comprehensive code for the nations, we might live together in
peace and all would be well with the world." 17 Both these groups will
profit by reading it as will those already better informed.
Allen Hunter White.t

SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY

TODAY. The Edward L. Bernays Lectures

of 1944 given at Cornell University by Carl L. Becker and others.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

1945.

Pp. x, 158. $2.00.

In the dim recesses of the reviewer's mind there is lurking a statement
made by an author now unknown to him, but it seems to the reviewer that
his analogy was particularly apt. He stated that the French treat liberty
as a mistress, always to be wooed in order to be retained; the English treat
her as an old friend, nothing to get excited about but always good to have
and worthwhile retaining; the Americans treat her as a family drudge and
eventually, through constant abuse, will cause her to leave them. We are
perhaps a long way from losing our "drudge" but we are sufficiently well
on the road that an examination of some ways to retain our liberties is
worthwhile.
This slim volume is one of the evidences that "good things come in
small packages," and, being short, it is even more to be recommended in
r4. Page 124.
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this day when too often quantity is deemed a substitute for quality. The
articles were originally delivered as lectures and therefore the reader is
fortunate to receive the authors' views in a lively and refreshing style that
is rarely found in an article prepared for publication. . While all the
material is interesting and shows much thought on the part of the lecturer,
little is presented in the usual scholarly style complete with footnotes and
other annotations. Former Attorney General Biddle's paper, however, is
printed with a few notes to supply the professional reader with case and
statutory citations to the text, but even this article is primarily designed to
be of interest to the lay reader.
Although these lectures were independently prepared with only the
title of the series set forth to guide the lecturers, there are common threads
running through all of them: all feel there is at present considerable abuse
of civil liberties in our country, that the abuse is by the government, public
offidials acting under color of office, private groups, and private individuals;
all believe that the best safeguard against further abuse and the prevention
of continuing encroachments upon such liberties is an informed public
opinion in the hands of a people energetic enough to make their voice
articulate and their will felt. This view is set forth particularly well in
Professor Robert E. Cushman's lecture, "Civil Liberty and Public
Opinion," in which he advances four propositions and ably defends the
accuracy of his views:
"First, public opinion can exist only where and when civil liberty is
kept alive. Second, civil liberty will exist only so long as it is supported and defended by public opinion. Third, public opinion with
respect to civil liberty today shows dangerous signs of being confused,
timid, and complacent. Fourth, courageous leadership and sound
education are vitally necessary if we are to keep alive a public opinion
which values civil liberty and will demand its effective protection." 1
Professor Becker discusses "Political Freedom: American Style" and
at theoutset introduces the reader to the proposition that freedom is little
more than a word of art, meaning all things to all men at all times, and
different things to different men at different times. After a brief excursion
into semantics he identifies freedom with liberty and individualism, and
then proceeds to show how the separation of powers, the limitations on the
government to keep its activities at a minimum, etc., reflected a fear of
encroachments on individual liberty by the state, and failed to provide a
safeguard against abuses by individuals.
Consequently, he asserts, the
excesses of democracy have, in some instances, led to a tyranny of the
majority, and thus the prophylaxis breeds the disease it was to prevent.
A mere listing in a statute of the liberties to be secured is no insurance of
their sanctity, and his suggestion for safeguarding them is that the political
power be united with political responsibility, and that politics be taken
seriously by each and every individual.
Editorial writer Max Lerner writes of "Freedom: Image and Reality"
and discusses the wide gulf between liberties on paper and liberties as
practical affairs in the world in which we live. Of the former, it is agreed
that as a nation we desire freedom and we pay lip service to the -ideal.
However, when the concept is viewed as an actuality, we, as individualsand collectively the individuals constitute the nation-are careless in retaini. Page 85.
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ing so precious a possession. Mr. Lerner states "that while the desire for
freedom has in some ways grown, the commitment to it has lessened." 2
He is alarmed at racial terrorism directed at Jews, Negroes, Mexicans,
Japanese-Americans, and others. He finds the causes in racist impulses
and in economic conditions. In a dynamic society the stationary forces
opposing normal progress breed dissent and discontent, and they, in turn,
father intolerance:
"Freedom does not thrive in a state with hermetically sealed frontiers,
shrunken perspectives, and a closed mind." 3
The former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission,
James L. Fly, discusses "Freedom of Speech and the Press." He sets as
his ideal a free competition in the world of ideas, but his exposition indicates that only a control of channels of communication by the government
can insure free publication of all ideas. This suggestion appears to be
merely a substitute of a public authority for a private one. The article was
quite interesting, especially in the description of the function and operation
of the Commission, but unfortunately the problem of preventing any
tyranny over the mind of man remains unanswered. Complete government
control is as undesirable as unbridled private competition, and a middle of
the road position merely softens the possible abuses but certainly does not
eliminate them.
The most interesting lecture, from the lawyer's point of view, is that
of former Attorney General Biddle in which he discusses "Civil Rights
and the Federal Law." In a brief exposition Mr. Biddle traces the origin
of our civil liberty statutes and then shows how the original strict enforcement was succeeded by a counter-swing of the pendulum in the opposite
direction so that for many years the rights were more noted in their
breach than in their observance. Especially of interest is the description
of some of the wartime activities of the Department of Justice. It is to be
noted that its functions were concerned with preserving essential liberties
and that unlike the Justice Department of World War I there was no
program of witch-hunting, mass indictments, and the like. This article,
more so than any other in the volume, defies abbreviation, and only by a
careful reading of the entire lecture will one be able to appreciate it fully.
A commencement address by President Edmund E. Day, of Cornell,
rounds out the volume. It is very fitting that the final selection is entitled
"Freedom to Learn" since it is this very freedom upon which most other
liberties depend. An enlightened electorate exercising an independent
franchise is perhaps the only guarantee of our liberties, and such an electorate depends on the opportunity to learn. Mr. Day asks for an elimination of personal bias and the development of a true, intellectual integrity.
On a nation-wide scale this is indeed the ideal, and like many ideals, it is a
goal to be sought though never to be realized. So perhaps it is with perfect liberty-always to be sought, though never fully realized.
Barton E. Ferst.t
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WILLiAm HOWARD TAFT, YALE PROFESSOR OF LAW AND NEW HAVEN
CITIZEN. By Frederick C. Hicks. New Haven: Yale University
Press. 1945. Pp. xiv, 158. $2.50.
It is not surprising that William Howard Taft, Kent Professor of
Law in Yale College, has received little attention from the biographers who
have treated of William Howarf Taft as Solicitor-General, Circuit Judge,
Governor-General of the Philippines, Secretary of War, President, and
Chief Justice of the United States. The eight quiet years spent in the
academic halls at New Haven hardly supply material for popular biography.
Their account does, however, make an interesting contribution to the
picture of Taft the man.
President Taft's decision to accept the Yale offer of a professorship,
after his defeat in the election of 1912, was not lightly made; he deemed
it worthy of discussion with the members of his cabinet, who are reported
to have given their wholehearted approval. Reluctance to enter the practice
of law, a desire to escape from the political limelight, and a sentimental
attachment to Yale seem to have been the motivating considerations. Displaying characteristic modesty, Taft declared that he accepted the position
not without some misgivings, for in a professor's chair "far more than on
the bench is one's ignorance and forgetfulness likely to be exposed."'
Also characteristically, he insisted upon resigning from the Yale Corporation on becoming a professor in its employ.
Shortly after his arrival he most emphatically quashed the suggestion
that he become Dean of the Law School, a position which he undoubtedly
could have had by mere acquiescence, and he consistently shunned University executive and administrative posts. The new professor took his
duties most seriously: he even attempted to read all the numerous quizzes
given in his undergraduate college course, and upon one occasion made a
two hundred mile trip from Lawrence, Massachusetts, in order to attend a
routine faculty meeting.
Like so many men who turn to an academic career late in life, Taft
was not a good teacher. His engaging personality and his wide experience
made him an interesting lecturer, but his classes became surprisingly dull
when he ettempted to conduct recitation or discussion. In the Law School
his teaching techniques were not stimulating. A casebook was used, but
he rarely took any interest in grappling with conflicting legal theories or
in reconciling cases. .There was very little critical or analytical discussion.
He was sincerely interested, however, in his students, and no doubt they
gained much from the association. The man's great qualities of humor,
humility, and devotion to public seirice, which emerge from the pages of
Mr. Hicks' book, must have had their effect in the classroom.
The author has chosen and arranged his material well and has performed a real service in making available this little-publicized chapter in
the life of the tenth Chief Justice and the twenty-seventh President of the
United States.
Paul W. Bruton.t
i. Page 6.
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